As Ireland prepares to hold the EU Presidency, the country will temporarily sit at the centre of European political decision-making. This role brings influence, visibility, and responsibility, but it also brings heightened cyber risk.

This article outlines why Ireland becomes a more attractive cyber target during the Presidency, who the attackers are, what types of attacks are most likely, and what organisations, particularly those in the supply chain, should be doing now.

Why the EU Presidency Increases Ireland’s Cyber Risk

Holding the EU Presidency significantly raises Ireland’s international visibility. During this period, Ireland will host high-level meetings where ministers and officials from across Europe negotiate legislation, sanctions, security policy and foreign affairs.

This means:

• Large volumes of sensitive political, economic and security-related information will flow through Irish systems.

• Ireland becomes a single coordination point for EU-level decision-making.

For attackers, this creates a simple equation: they don’t need to compromise 27 countries, they only need to compromise the one coordinating them.

Targeting the Presidency country offers opportunities to:

• Steal negotiation positions or confidential documents

• Leak or manipulate information to cause political embarrassment

• Disrupt meetings or communications at strategically sensitive moments

Who Are the Attackers?

The cyber threat landscape is not made up of a single type of adversary. In practice, Ireland faces a broad ecosystem of attackers, each with different motives.

Financially Motivated Cyber-Criminals

These are organised, professional groups whose primary goal is money. They operate ransomware campaigns, steal data, and increasingly function like businesses, renting tools, running helpdesks, and using AI to improve phishing and fraud.

Ireland is attractive to them because it is:

• Highly digital

• Data-rich

• Home to organisations where disruption can have wide knock-on effects

State-Backed or State-Aligned Actors

These groups are linked directly or indirectly to foreign governments. Their objectives are strategic rather than financial: espionage, intelligence gathering, and quiet access to decision-making processes.

During the EU Presidency, Ireland becomes especially valuable to these actors because access to Irish systems can provide insight into EU negotiations and policy direction.

Hacktivist and Ideological Groups

While often less sophisticated, these groups can still cause disruption through website defacements or denial-of-service attacks. They tend to target high-profile political moments simply because they attract attention.

Ireland’s Strategic Digital Importance

Ireland’s cyber risk is not only political, it is structural.

Ireland hosts significant concentration of major global data centres and several critical transatlantic subsea internet cables carrying traffic between Europe and the United States.  This infrastructure underpins cloud services, communications, logistics and business operations across Europe. As a result, a cyber incident in Ireland is rarely just an Irish issue.

An outage or compromise affecting major data centre, or a cable landing station can have continent-wide consequences. For attackers, this creates leverage: a relatively small country with infrastructure that supports large parts of the European digital economy.

The Most Likely Cyber Threats Today

The most common and impactful attack types organisations should expect include:

• Ransomware — systems encrypted and held to ransom

• DDoS attacks — public-facing services overwhelmed and taken offline

• Espionage intrusions — attackers quietly embedded in networks to observe or exfiltrate data

• AI-powered social engineering — highly convincing phishing emails, messages or voice impersonation

These threats are particularly effective during periods like the EU Presidency because:

• Communication volumes increase

• Temporary systems and new platforms are deployed

• International contacts multiply

• Staff are busier and decision-making is more pressured

Cybersecurity Risks of Hosting the EU Presidency

During the Presidency, Ireland should expect:

• Increased espionage attempts targeting government systems and suppliers

• Disruption-focused attacks against websites, payment systems or communications to create embarrassment or delay EU business

• Targeting of critical digital infrastructure, where impact extends beyond Ireland

• Disinformation campaigns, where even minor outages are amplified using fake documents, audio or misleading narratives

Which Organisations Are Most at Risk?

The Supply Chain — the Primary Target

Attackers consistently choose the easiest path in. Increasingly, that path runs through smaller suppliers rather than large, well-defended organisations.

Any business connected to government, EU-related work or critical services becomes part of the risk picture — regardless of size.

Organisations to Be Especially Mindful

• Suppliers to government departments (IT, consulting, logistics, events, communications)

• Cloud and data-centre operators, where disruption has multi-country impact

• Telecoms and internet infrastructure providers, including subsea cable operators

• Critical services such as energy, transport, healthcare and finance

No organisation should underestimate its value to attackers simply because it is “not the main target”. Effective third-party risk management removes that uncertainty by revealing where external weaknesses exist.

Practical Steps Organisations Should Take Now:

1. Lock Down Access
   Audit and strictly limit any access connected to government or EU-related systems. Attackers will actively search for weak links in supplier networks.

2. Patch Quickly
   State-aligned actors exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities rapidly. Slow patching becomes a serious risk during periods of heightened attention.

3. Prepare for Disruption
   Organisations supporting government, media or events should assume phishing waves or DDoS attempts around key dates. Incident response plans should be simple, rehearsed and understood.

4. Train Staff for Targeted Phishing
   Expect a surge in convincing, context-aware phishing and misinformation. Early detection by staff remains one of the most effective defences against social engineering attacks such as phishing.

5. Strengthen Monitoring and Response
   Tools matter, but speed matters more. Faster detection and response dramatically limit impact.

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Denmark (2025)

Context: Heightened geopolitical tension
What happened: Danish authorities reported cyber disruption affecting government and defence-related public websites, assessed as part of wider geopolitical cyber activity.
Why it’s relevant: Shows continued targeting of politically visible EU states through disruption-style attacks.

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Germany (2024)

Context: European elections and support for Ukraine
What happened: German federal institutions and political organisations experienced DDoS attacks, publicly attributed to pro-Russian hacktivist groups.
Why it’s relevant: Demonstrates the use of cyber disruption to influence political processes, not just steal data.

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Poland (2023)

Context: National elections and strong EU/NATO role
What happened: Polish government and public-sector websites were targeted by cyber disruption and influence activity during election periods.
Why it’s relevant: Reinforces that election cycles and political visibility increase cyber pressure.

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Finland (2023)

Context: NATO accession
What happened: Finnish government services and public websites were hit by DDoS attacks following NATO membership announcements.
Why it’s relevant: Clear example of cyber activity used as geopolitical signalling rather than purely criminal action.

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France (2022)

Context: EU Presidency
What happened: French authorities warned of increased phishing, DDoS and espionage attempts targeting government bodies and suppliers during the Presidency.
Why it’s relevant: Confirms EU Presidencies attract elevated cyber activity, including supply-chain targeting.

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Czech Republic (2022–2023)

Context: EU Presidency during heightened geopolitical conflict
What happened: Czech authorities reported sustained hostile cyber activity against state institutions throughout the Presidency period.
Why it’s relevant: Shows prolonged cyber pressure linked to political roles, not one-off incidents.

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Estonia (2007)

Context: Politically sensitive national decision
What happened: Large-scale cyber disruption affected government, media and banking services.
Why it’s relevant: Established cyber operations as a tool of political pressure in Europe.

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Resilience, Not Invisibility

It is unrealistic to think Ireland can make itself “uninteresting” to attackers. Ireland is already attractive because it is:

• Highly digital

• A major data-centre hub

• A landing point for critical subsea cables

• Temporarily central to EU decision-making

The real question is not whether attackers will try, but what happens when they do.

The lesson from past incidents is clear: resilience (rapid detection, decisive response, and limited impact) is what separates manageable incidents from national-level disruption.

Ireland has made real progress since the 2021 HSE attack. Cybersecurity is now understood as a national resilience and service-continuity issue, not just an IT problem. Investment has increased, leadership engagement is stronger, and collaboration with the National Cyber Security Centre has improved.

However, challenges remain:

• Legacy systems still in use

• Supply-chain security gaps

• Operational technology that is not sufficiently segmented or tested

• Skills shortages and slow incident decision-making

Attackers are becoming faster, more patient and more automated. Maintaining momentum is critical.